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During a hypothetical severe accident in a nuclear reactor most of the radioactivity would be released
from the damaged core and the broken primary circuit in the form of aerosols and chemical vapours and
gases. However the effective radio-toxicity per unit release from the fuel depends both on the released
mass and on the chemical form as well. The ﬁssion products release and transport in the circuit has been
analysed for a Medium Break cold leg Loss Of Coolant Accident (MBLOCA) combined with the total loss of
electric power supply (Station Black Out) for a reference PWR 1000 reactor using the severe accident
integral code ASTECV1.3 rev2. A detailed description of the reactor model is given. Sensitivity analyses
were performed in terms of break location and accumulator availability. The break location has an impact
on the carrier gas temperature and in turn on the chemical speciation of the ﬁssion products. Also
retention is inﬂuenced by the different ﬂow pathways establishing in the circuit. The accumulator
availability extends the duration of the core degradation process affecting the total production of
hydrogen and the cumulative released mass of low, semi and highly volatile ﬁssion products. In agree-
ment with the ASTEC equilibrium chemistry model, the Mo/Cs (Rb) molar ratio has the most inﬂuence on
the fraction of iodine which can reach the containment in the gaseous or highly volatile form. Due to the
surplus of Cs, the predicted dominant iodine species to the containment are CsI and its dimers. A 3e4% of
iodine which reaches the break exists in gaseous (HI) and highly volatile metal-iodides (I2MoO2, SnI2,
SnI4) species.
© 2015 The Authors. Published by Elsevier Ltd. This is an open access article under the CC BY-NC-ND
license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).1. Introduction
Risk-oriented safety assessment and severe accident manage-
ment (SAM)measures are currently developed and implemented at
NPPs to prevent or to mitigate severe accidents. Such activities are
only possible if there is a deep understanding of processes leading
to severe accidents and of phenomena related to them. Validation
of codes and uncertainties evaluation is consequently needed to
take account of severe accident measures in the regulation of
plants.
Integral computer codes are being developed and assessed to
simulate the scenario of a hypothetical severe accident in a nuclear
reactor, from the initial event until the possible radiological release
of ﬁssion products (FPs) out of the containment. They include the
relevant physical phenomena that occur in the different reactorTransport EC e JRC, Nuclear
O Box 2, 1755 LE Petten, The
5621.
Ammirabile).
Ltd. This is an open access article uzones (core, primary loop, containment) and simulate the actuation
of safety systems by procedures and by operators. Also, a
compromise must be found between the accuracy of models and
calculation time in order to study a great number of scenarios. In-
tegral codes were ﬁrst developed in the United States (MAAP4
(Fauske, 1994), MELCOR (Gauntt et al., 2000)) and are now used
worldwide. In Europe, the experimental and analytical work in the
ﬁeld of severe accidents was mainly performed in France and
Germany, albeit in a distinct manner. Consequently, the French
IRSN and the German GRS decided to co-operate in the develop-
ment and validation of a new integral code ASTEC that would
contain the best available modelling.
ASTEC code has progressively reached a larger European
dimension through the European Commission Framework Pro-
gramme projects: VASA (FP4) (Allelein et al., 2000), EVITA (FP5)
(Allelein et al., 2003), SARNET (FP6) (Haste et al., 2009) and
SARNET II (Severe Accident Research Network of Excellence) (FP7)
(European Commission, 2008). Within these projects, and inte-
grated in a series of other severe accident activities, the code has
been validated over a large number of experimental programsnder the CC BY-NC-ND license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).
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L. Ammirabile et al. / Progress in Nuclear Energy 81 (2015) 30e42 31performed in in-pile and out-of-pile facilities, at various scales.
These included analytical experiments, coupled-effect tests and
integral experiments (e.g. PHEBUS-FP, PACTEL, CORA-13) mostly
belonging to the list of ISP OECD exercises. Besides the experiment
selected, the ASTEC modules were also applied in several bench-
marks on plant applications with other codes such as MELCOR and
MAAP4.
The JRC-IET has greatly contributed to the validation of the
ASTEC code (ELSA/DIVA, SOPHAEROS, CPA modules), mainly in
ﬁssion product release and transport in the circuits and contain-
ment (PHEBUS-FP, STORM) (Ammirabile et al., 2010; Bujan et al.,
2010a, 2010b, 2011; Gyenes and Ammirabile, 2011; Toth et al.,
2010).
This paper focuses on themain application of ASTEC code for the
evaluation of the source term and its chemical forms in severe
accident plant analysis. Based on the NUREG-1150 (USNRC, 1990)
and NUREG/CR-5750 (Poloski et al., 1999) LOCA size classiﬁcation, a
severe Medium Break LOCA accident study on the cold leg, com-
bined with the total loss of electric power supply (Station Black-
Out), has been performed for a reference 3-loop PWR 1000 MWe.
Such sequence is ascribed among the low pressure core melt sce-
narios that result in a relatively low level of ﬁssion product reten-
tion within the RCS leading to a high release of ﬁssion products
from the core into containment during the early in-vessel release
phase. Since the early in-vessel release phase experience the largest
release of ﬁssion products into the containment, the selection of a
low pressure core melt scenario provides a high estimate of the
total quantity of ﬁssion products to containment, as well as that
during the early in-vessel release phase (Soffer et al., 1995).
The effective radio-toxicity per unit release from the fuel de-
pends not only from their mass but also on the chemical forms as
well, since with speciation the transport characteristic results in
more or less being transported through the structures. In particular
gaseous iodine release is a main concern. So far the chemical form
of gaseous iodine was identiﬁed as I2 and/or HI. However, this
needs conﬁrmation and recently some preliminary calculations
showed that gaseous iodine can be released in the form of metal-
iodides as well. The conﬁrmation of iodine in the form of I2 and/
or HI and the identiﬁcation of new metallic forms could lead to
novel approaches in the management and mitigation of conse-
quences of iodine release.
Section 2 gives a short description of the ASTEC code, the plant
input and the choice of physical models, the selected severe acci-
dent sequences and analysed cases. Section 3 describes the accident
evolution and the sensitivity studies performed changing the breaklocation and the availability of accumulators. The main ﬁndings are
summarised in Section 4.2. Analytical tools and reactor model
The integral code ASTEC (Accident Source Term Evaluation
Code) (Van Dorsselaere, 2007) has been developed by IRSN (Institut
de Radioprotection et de Sûrete Nucleaire), France, and GRS
(Gesellschaft für Anlagen-und Reaktorsicherheit), Germany, since
1994.
The aim is to have a fast running integral code which is able to
simulate the entire sequence of a severe accident in a light water
reactor from the initiating event through to Fission Product (FP)
release out of the containment, covering all important in-vessel and
ex-vessel phenomena. The main ﬁelds of application of this code
are:
eSource term determination studies;
eProbabilistic Safety Assessment level 2 (PSA-2) studies;
eAccident management studies;
ePhysical analyses of experiments to improve the understand-
ing of the phenomenology.
The V1.3-rev2 version of the integral code ASTEC (Accident
Source Term Evaluation Code) has been used for a present study,
and it is designed to simulate all phases of a plant severe accident,
the relevant plant phenomena and components.2.1. ASTEC code
The ASTEC code has a modular structure which allows the user
to select the packages that ﬁt best with the analysis objectives.
With the present study only devoted to modelling the phenomena
in the reactor coolant system, the following description concerns
only the ASTEC modules which were activated in so-called coupled
mode, namely CESAR, DIVA, ELSA and SOPHAEROS.
The CESAR module (Tregoures and Moal, 2007; Piar and
Treogures, 2009) simulates the thermal-hydraulics (t-h) in the
primary circuit, secondary circuit and in the RPV (with a simpliﬁed
core modelling) up to the beginning of the core degradation phase,
i.e. roughly up to the start of core uncovery, and in any case before
the start of Zircaloy cladding oxidation by steam. After the onset of
the core degradation phase, the CESAR module computes only the
thermo-hydraulics in the primary and secondary circuit as well as
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mono-dimensional two-ﬂuid ﬁve-equation approach.
The DIVAmodule (Guillard et al., 2007) deals with the in-vessel
degradation phenomena (both early and late degradation phases).
The thermal-hydraulics in the RPV (core, core by-pass, lower
plenum and downcomer) during core degradation is performed by
the DIVA module. The core degradation process is characterized by
the high complexity of phenomena and geometry, with a perma-
nent appearance and disappearance of a large number of compo-
nents in each control volume by melting, failure, relocation,
chemical reactions, etc. This needs a dynamic management of these
components. The core is discretised in cylindrical rings and axial
meshes, only one representative component of the fuel and control
rods being considered in each ring, weighted by the true number of
rods.
The ELSA module (Plumecocq and Guillard, 2006) aims at
simulating the release of FP/SM from the degraded core. ELSA is
tightly coupled with the DIVA module. The modelling allows
describing the release from fuel and control rods, followed by the
release from debris beds (if any) and then, the release from the in-
core molten pool. The modelling is based on a semi-empirical
approach.
For intact fuel rods and debris beds, the release of FP is described
according to the degree of ﬁssion product volatility, and three
categories are considered:
1. Volatiles such as I and Cs, whose kinetics of release depends on
the rate-limiting process of solid state diffusion through grains
of the UO2 fuel matrix. Release will occur at the cracking of
cladding that is calculated by the DIVA core degradation mod-
ule. The amount of ﬁssion product release at clad failure is user-
deﬁned and it corresponds to the initial gap inventory of a fuel
rod (a default inventory is proposed for PWRs). All volatile
species are released from the fuel matrix at the same rate and
reach the fuel-to-clad gap. Some of these species (e.g. Se, Te and
Sb) can chemically react with the inner surface of the Zircaloy
cladding, depending on the degree of the cladding oxidation. At
fuel melting point, 100% of remaining volatile ﬁssion products is
assumed to be released instantaneously from the fuel liquid
fraction.
2. semi-volatiles such as Ba and Ru, which are thought to diffuse to
grain boundaries at approximately the same rate as the volatile
ﬁssion products, but to be released from the fuel at lower rates,
governed by evaporation and mass transfer processes.
3. low-volatiles such as U and Zr, for which neither diffusion in fuel
matrix nor vapour pressure are signiﬁcant. Their release from
intact fuels and debris beds is assumed to be governed by the
volatilisation of UO2. The release is proportional to the volatil-
ised fuel. This approach may be conservative for some elements
such as Zr. The approach used for the modelling of the volatili-
sation of UO2 is based on the same approach as used for the
release of semi-volatile ﬁssion products but take place only after
a severe degradation of the fuel rods.
The release of FP from debris beds is based on the same
approach as used for intact fuel. The only difference concerns the
deﬁnition of the average effective ratio S/V used in the calculation
of the stoichiometry deviation.
Concerning the SM, release of Ag, In, Cd, Fe, Ni, Cr and Sn it is
taken into account in ELSA as semi-volatile species released from
degraded control rods (for Ag, In and Cd) and during the candling of
steel material (for Fe, Ni and Cr). The release of AgeIneCd control
rods is of prime interest since the resulting vapours and aerosols
may inﬂuence FP transport, and also because silver-containing
aerosols are likely to trap radioactive iodine in the containment.In ELSA, release of AgeIneCd is initiated according to criteria on
cladding status, and three cases are considered:
1. release through cracks at cladding failure: since Cd is by far the
most volatile species of control rods, it will be released signiﬁ-
cantly from the beginning of the cracking of the clad, while Ag
and In will be released more slowly; the same correlations are
used for the release occurring during the candling of materials.
A corrective factor is applied on the exchange surface reﬂecting
the geometry, as there is very little access to the gas stream to a
liquid AgeIneCd surface. This factor was ﬁtted on PHEBUS FPT1
data (Haste, 2003), and tested using FPT0 data.
2. release during relocation of molten materials at cladding
melting point: Ag, In and Cd during the candling of materials are
released according to the evaporation and mass transfer pro-
cesses alike semi-volatile FP. A simple equilibrium vapour-
pressure model for silver, indium and cadmium is used.
3. release from the free surface of the liquid alloy retained within
the cladding still in place: the same correlations as for the
release occurring during the candling of materials are used and
no equilibrium calculation is performed. According to the axial
meshing of rods, only meshes having a free surface are involved
in the release of species.
Remaining molten AgeIneCd in the lower head vessel corium
pool is released by using the molten pool model.
The model for the release of Fe, Ni and Cr during candling of
steel materials is the same as the one used for the release of
AgeIneCd during candling of control rods, but considering the
partial pressures of Fe, Ni and Cr, corresponding to Steel 304L used
in light water reactors.
At temperatures corresponding to the melting of steel (around
1723 K), partial pressures of species remain low. At higher tem-
peratures, after relocation of molten materials in the lower part of
the vessel, partial pressures of species may become signiﬁcant.
Release of species from this part of the vessel is performed by using
the molten pool model.
A simple model, ignoring effects of pre-oxidation and atmo-
sphere, has been implemented for the release of Sn (tin), taking
advantage of the correlation observed in the PHEBUS FPT1 test
between the hydrogen production and Sn release (Jacquemain
et al., 2000): Sn release is taken as being proportional to the rate
of formation of ZrO2 rather than the hydrogen production since
hydrogen can be produced from B4C and stainless steel oxidation.
All mentioned SM can also be released from the corium molten
pool.
The SOPHAEROS module (Cousin, 2006) computes the trans-
port of FP/SM vapours and aerosols in the RCS through gas ﬂow to
the containment, simulating the main vapour-phase and aerosol
phenomena with mechanistic and semi-empirical models that use
twelve families of species (elements, compounds, gas, volatile, non-
volatile…) and ﬁve states (suspended vapours, suspended aerosols,
vapour condensed onwalls, deposited aerosols, adsorbed vapours).
Phenomena considered in SOPHAEROS include:
a) chemical interactions of all gas and vapour species;
b) transport of suspended vapours by the carrier ﬂuid along the
circuit;
c) coagulation (or agglomeration) of suspended aerosols;
d) deposition of aerosols on structure surfaces;
e) mechanical re-suspension of deposited aerosol on structure
surfaces;
f) homogeneous nucleation of vapours and vapour condensa-
tion/evaporation on/from suspended aerosols (i.e. hetero-
geneous nucleation);
Table 1
Nominal operating parameters of the reference PWR 1000.
Parameter Value Unit
Reactor thermal power 2998 MW
Pressurizer pressure 15.47 MPa
Average temperature at core inlet 285.1 C
Average temperature at core outlet 323.8 C
Average coolant heating in core 38.7 C
Total mass of water in primary circuit 198655.0 kg
Water mass in the pressurizer 18000.0 kg
Coolant ﬂow through 1 MCP 4542.0 kg.s1
Total mass of water in secondary circuit 183768.0 kg
Pressure in the SG 6.136 MPa
Steam temperature in SG 277.0 C
Steam mass ﬂow from one SG 536.6 kg.s1
Feedwater temperature 216.9 C
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surfaces;
h) vapour evaporation from deposited aerosols;
i) vapour sorbtion on structure surfaces, an irreversible
process.
The chemistry module calculates the gaseous-species masses in
thermodynamic chemical equilibrium in each control volume
based on the masses of the elements, the temperature and the
volume. The chemical speciation can change with temperature,
carrier gas composition, and concentration of the different gaseous
species. The energy involved in chemical reactions is neglected and
the carrier-gas mass does not change even if some of it participates
in chemical reactions. These assumptions are approximations
imposed by the fact that this module does not calculate thermal
hydraulic conditions.
The ASTEC/SOPHAEROS database can handle 66 elements
(Cousin, 2006) including iodine, caesium and rubidium species,
that have been selected to participate in vapour-phase chemistry
and are required for full analyses of LWR reactors and related
experiments.
Four noble gases He, Ar, Xe and Kr, are also elements in the
gaseous phase but do not participate in chemical reactions.
For the 66 elements, 2549 species can be found in these data-
bases in the vapour and condensed phases. It is neither practical
nor necessary to work with all the species identiﬁed as being
potentially formed from the 66 elements involved. Hence, it was
decided to assess the stability of species over the range of condi-
tions encountered in reactor accidents to eliminate compounds of
low signiﬁcance. From the potential 2549 substances, this allowed
reduction to 1423 species of which 736 are vapours and 684 are in
condensed phases.
Since in SOPHAEROS all chemistry is calculated in the vapour
phase, it is the 736 vapour species which determine the size of the
database and the number of chemistry-related calculations per-
formed during execution of the module.
Aerosols behaviour in a reactor primary system is the result of
aerosol transport with the ﬂuid, aerosol deposition, and aerosol
resuspension. Deposition removes aerosols from further transport
with the ﬂuid reducing the source term whereas resuspension re-
stores deposited aerosols to the ﬂuid system: resuspended aerosols
are again available to transport with the ﬂuid andmay contribute to
an increase in the source term.
Seven different mechanisms of particle deposition on structure
surfaces can be taken into account: gravitational settling, Brownian
diffusion, turbulent diffusion, turbulent-eddy impaction, impaction
in bends, impaction in contractions, thermophoresis, diffusion-
phoresis. The user can choose to activate or inactivate each of
these mechanisms.
The deposition rates are calculated for each mechanism, particle
size class and wall belonging to a given control volume.
Mechanical resuspension takes place essentially for turbulent
ﬂuid ﬂow conditions and is inhibited by humidity: the surrounding
atmosphere, the deposition surface, and the aerosol deposit itself
should be dry.
In the SOPHAEROS module of ASTEC V1.3 (Cousin, 2006), there
are two models available for calculating the resuspension of
deposited aerosols: the semi-empirical Force-Balancemodel (FB) as
a default option and the alternative Rock ‘n’ Roll (RnR) model based
on the approach developed by Biasi et al. (2001).
In the former model the forces acting on deposited particles are
compared and resuspension occurs when the aerodynamic removal
forces exceed the adhesive forces detaching the particle from the
surface. The aerodynamic removal forces comprise the drag and lift
forces due to the turbulent ﬂuid ﬂow. The adhesive forces compriseall the forces causing particles to stick to a deposition surface
including gravitational force active for surfaces including an up-
ward facing component. The comparison of these counteracting
forces results in a criterion for the onset of resuspension. The extent
of resuspension cannot be derived from the force-balance model
but it is evaluated by use of a semiempirical resuspension-rate
formula (Parozzi, 1992).
The latter mechanical resuspensionmodel was introduced (Biasi
et al., 2001) considering force-balance approach limitations in ISP
40 where the kinetics of the aerosols resuspension was not well
reproduced by the force-balance model.
The rock'n’roll model is originally a dynamic model based on
energy transfer between turbulent gas ﬂow and deposited aerosols
for an isolated particle. The particle is assumed (by simpliﬁcation)
to have only two points of contact with surface. Under the ﬂuctu-
ations of the aerodynamic forces, it oscillates around the second
point until to have accumulated sufﬁcient rotational energy to leave
the ﬁrst point deﬁnitively. It can then either start to roll under the
drag force, or to raise itself if the lift force is sufﬁcient: in both cases,
there is particle resuspension. The transfer of energy is all the more
effective if it takes place at the natural frequency of the movement
particle e surface (transfer of resounding energy) what occurs
when the frequency characteristic of the ﬂuctuations of the aero-
dynamic forces is close to this value.2.2. PWR 1000 MWe computational model
A 3-loop PWR 1000 MWe has been chosen as reference plant,
based mainly on the public data available and the diffusion of this
type of reactor in Europe. The nominal plant operating parameters
are given in Table 1. A more detailed description of the plant and
also of the computational model for integral code ASTEC can be
found in Bujan et al. (2008). The reactor coolant system (RCS)
consists of the reactor pressure vessel (RPV), three loops with U-
tube steam generators, the pressurizer with relief and safety valves
and engineered safeguards, in particular the safety injection sys-
tems (accumulators, high and low pressure injection systems). The
containment system is not considered since the present study deals
only with phenomena taking place in the RCS until RPV lower head
failure occurs and with the evaluation of the source term to
containment.
The reactor vessel components include the fuel and control rods
(placed in guide tubes), spacer grids, the upper and lower struc-
tures, which occupy the hydraulic nodes that represent the core
and core by-pass, lower plenum, downcomer and upper plenum
(Fig. 1). The active core is subdivided into eleven equi-length axial
meshes and into three radial zones (rings) with associated liquid
and gas channels. The core by-pass is modelled between two
Fig. 1. Primary circuit nodalization scheme.
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structure to protect RPV sidewall). The core radius is ~1.5 m and the
inner radius of the RPV side wall is ~2 m. The reference elevation
(þ0.0 m) corresponds to the bottom of the active core, the
elevation þ3.66 m corresponds to the top of the active core. The
core in RPV consists of 41448 fuel rods made of UO2 pellets in
Zircaloy (Zry) claddings (Zr e 98.3%, Sn e 1.4%, Fe e 0.2% and Cr e
0.1%) and of 3768 control rods made of SIC neutron absorber (Ag e
80%, In e 15% and Cd e 5%).
The representative initial inventory (i.i.) of the ﬁssion products
corresponds to the standard PWR with the nominal thermal power
~3000MWt at the end of equilibrium fuel cycle. The complete list of
the radio-nuclides considered in the module ELSA consists of 42 FP
and 5 actinides. Fractions of the i.i. assumed to be in the fuel-to-gap
are as following: 0.01 (Xe, Kr), 0.005 (I, Br, Cs), 1.E-4 (Te, Ba) and 1.E-
5 (Ru, Rh).
The Urbanic correlation (default option) is used for oxidation
kinetics of the fuel rod claddings and guide tubes and the convec-
tive KimeOlander correlation (default option) is used for calcula-
tion of UO2 and ZrO2 dissolution by liquid zirconium creating the
complex material mixture UeOeZr. The fuel rod cladding stress-
strain analysis is performed by the ICARE module. The rupture of
cladding is not computed by the mechanistic model, but simply
simulated by a threshold temperature equal to 1173 K. Thus, theTable 2
Cases studied.
Break location Accumulators
Case 1A ULEGB1 No
Case 1B COL1 No
Case 2A ULEGB1 Yes
Case 2B COL1 Yesonset of FP release as well as the oxidation of cladding internal
surface is initiated at the same temperature. Melt of fuel (fuel
relocation temperature) is simulated by change of the state from
compact to dislocated at a temperature equal to 2400 K (start of
UeOeZr melting).
The primary part of the RCS input model is a coarse node rep-
resentation of the hydraulic system and structures comprising
about 60 hydraulic control volumes (cells), of which about 36 cells
are used for the U-tubes of the steam generators (SG). Each of the
three loops is equipped with a primary circulation pump.
The pressurizer (PRZ) is modelled as one cylindrical volume
with an inner diameter of 2.15 m and with a total volume of 38 m3.
There are 2 valves connected to the pressurizer to simulate the
relief and safety valves.
There are 3 identical accumulators as passive emergency in-
jection system (INJACC1, 2, 3), one for each loop, connected to the
cold leg volumes (volumes COL1, 2 and 3) of the corresponding
primary circuit loop. To the same volumes are connected three
trains of high pressure (HPI1, 2, 3) and low pressure (LPI1, 2, 3)
emergency core cooling systems (not used in this study).
The computational model of the secondary circuit consists of
three identical steam generators connected to a common steam
header (volume GVCOL).
There are 3 main feedwater pumps in the secondary circuit (one
for SG) with a nominal mass ﬂow rate of 560 kg/s. The feedwater
temperature is equal to 490 K (217 C). There are also 3 auxiliary
feedwater pumps with a nominal mass ﬂow rate of 25 kg/s the
feedwater temperature is equal to 305 K (32 C).
Each SG is equipped with 2 regulation valves representing the
SG relief and safety valves.
Fission products and structural materials (vapours, aerosols)
transport and deposition in the primary circuit calculated by
SOPHAEROS module depend on the release kinetics from the fuel
Table 3
Timing of main events and selected results at time of RV lower head failure.
Event Case 1A [s] Case 1B [s] Case 2A [s] Case 2B [s]
Break opening 98.0 98.0 98.0 98.0
Reactor scram (stop of MCP and feedwater ﬂow to SG) 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Start of DIVA 2330.0 2200.0 2325.0 2200.0
Beginning of oxidation 2495.9 2777.0 2476.0 2763.7
Start of SM release 2764.7 2990.8 2764.0 2982.5
Start of FP release 2769.0 2999.6 2772.0 2991.8
Start of accumulators discharge e e 3293.5 3471.6
Stop of accumulators discharge e e 15149.7 15519.7
1st total core uncovery 3330.0 3545.0 3300.0 3475.0
1st material slump in lower plenum 3473.9 3663.0 3402.7 3571.0
Melting pool formation 3613.7 3763.0 3745.3 3836.4
1st slump of corium with FP 3693.0 3868.0 6036.2 16692.8
1st lateral slump in lower plenum e e 6036.2 e
Lower head vessel failure 5514.4 5606.7 18753.7 19343.7
Corium mass in the lower head, [kg]

















Remaining mass of water in the RV lower plenum [tons] ~9 ~8.5 ~14.5 ~13
Total mass of H2 produced, [kg] 133.43 128.15 206.0 226.4
Total mass released in-vessel, [kg] 1476.5 1046.6 1184.0 1627.0
Total FP/SM mass leaked from circuit, [kg] 526.62 276.13 487.39 408.9
L. Ammirabile et al. / Progress in Nuclear Energy 81 (2015) 30e42 35and control rods, leakage pathway from the core volume to the
break and on the boundary conditions calculated by CESAR module
(carrier gas mass ﬂow rates, gas and wall temperatures). All phys-
ical processes simulated in the SOPHAEROS module (homogeneous
and heterogeneous nucleation of vapours, condensation and re-
evaporation of vapours on (from) the wall surfaces, aerosols grav-
itational settling, thermo-phoresis, turbulent-eddy impaction and
resuspension) were taken into account in the analyses, using the
default options including the “vapour chemistry” model.2.3. Postulated accident scenarios
The accident is assumed to be initiated by a medium size break
(MBLOCA, external diameter ¼ 51.6 mm ~ 20.9 cm2 ~ 3.24 in2) on
the cold leg of the primary loop connected with the pressurizer,
combined with the total loss of electric power supply (station
blackout).
As deﬁnition of Medium Break, the three categories of NUREG-
1150 and NUREG/CR-5750 in LOCA size classiﬁcation were consid-
ered, where a Medium Break is deﬁned as having a ﬂow rate be-
tween 94 kg/s and 320 kg/s. Both high and low pressure injection
pumps of the emergency core cooling systems (ECCS) are postu-
lated to be unavailable. Four distinct cases have been consideredFig. 2. Pressure in the primary circuit (PR_PRZ) and in the SG secondary side (Case 1A),
secondary pressures in SG3 and SG2 are identical.based on the availability of the accumulators and on the exact
location of the break (Table 2). This allowed to assess the impact on
the source term to the containment due to the duration of the core
degradation and in-vessel release phase (accumulators) and to the
formation of different ﬂow paths affecting the FP/SM transport and
retention in the RCS (break location). Sensitivity analyses of other
parameters for LOCA (e.g. bypass of safety injection ﬂow, level of
decay heat) were not considered in the study.3. Accident analysis
3.1. Thermal-hydraulics accident evolution
The timing of themain events is presented for all the cases in the
Table 3. The time of RV lower head vessel failure corresponds to the
end of the calculation.
The availability of the accumulators has clearly a strong impact
on the accident sequence evolution both in the duration of the core
degradation process and in the timing of RV lower head failure.
Indeed the RV lower head failure occurs in 5514 s and 5606 s
respectively for Case 1A and Case 1B while it increases to 18753 s
and 19343 s respectively for Case 2A and Case 2B.Fig. 3. Water (QL_) and steam (QV_) mass ﬂow rate through the break (Case 1A).
Fig. 4. Hydrogen generation rate in RV (Case 1A).
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In Case 1A the break causes the primary pressure (Fig. 2) to
decrease until saturation is reached (9.5 MPa). The secondary
pressure in all three SG increases to ~8.3 MPa due to the loss of
secondary feedwater and the SG water inventory starts to decrease
through the opening of SG relief valves.
During the early stage of the depressurization, the break ﬂow is
not capable of removing all the decay heat. Therefore, the early
depressurization is limited by energy removal considerations, and
the RCS pressure will temporarily couple with the steam generator
pressure. The RCS pressure stays at secondary pressure level,
providing a temperature difference from primary to secondary so
that core heat may be removed by the steam generator through SG
relief valves. This phase lasts until ~2600 s when voiding
throughout the primary side occurs and the start of core uncovery
causes a signiﬁcant part of the decay heat to heat up the core
structures instead of primary coolant (see Fig. 3). Eventually the
RCS pressure begins to decrease below the secondary pressure.
At time ~2300 s the core starts to uncover and after ~1000 s is
totally uncovered (~3300 s). Temperature increase of fuel rod
cladding and guide tube (made also from Zircaloy alloy) above
1000 K triggers the hydrogen production (Fig. 4).
The ﬁrst molten material produced in the core region is due to
themelting of SIC control rods as the temperature reaches 1100 K. A
complex material mixture UeOeZr is formed due to UO2 and ZrO2
dissolution by molten Zr from the Zircaloy alloy, when the
maximum cladding temperature reaches ~2100 K. Slightly later
when temperature reaches ~2400 K, the eutectic (UeOeZr) starts
to melt forming a pool inside the core region (time ~3614 s); ac-
cording to ASTEC a pool is formedwhen at least in one coremesh all
components have a molten fraction greater than 90% and the mesh
below is blocked.Fig. 5. Material composition in the RV lower plenum (Case 1A).The corium deposition in the lower head begins at 3474 s in the
transient when ﬁrst material slump into RV lower plenum is pre-
dicted (Fig. 5). This is mainly due to the fact that the core support
plate was not included in the model. The ﬁrst slumped material is
composed of metals (Mmeta) mainly coming from molten SIC and
molten Zircaloy and solid debris (Mdebr) followed by slumps of
oxide molten pool (Mpool) (UO2, ZrO2) that gradually increase until
the fuel in the ﬁrst (central) and the second radial core ring melt
almost completely and relocates emptying this core region. Most of
the fuel in the third ring remains in place.
At the predicted time of RV lower head plastic rupture (5514.4 s)
due to mechanic stress, the total mass of slump molten materials
into the lower head reached 65.3 tons (see Table 3) representing
~70% of the total mass of active core materials (~67.9 t of
UO2 þ ~24.7 t of SIC and SM ¼ 92.6 t). The mass of water in the RV
lower head (Mliq0) at failure time is ~9 tons (Fig. 5). Following the
lower head failure, about 5 tons of corium remain inside the vessel
and 60 tons ﬂows out.
3.1.2. Case 1B
In Case 1B the different break location appears to have small
inﬂuence on the timing of the main events. The difference is
remarkable as regards of total mass of aerosols generation,
transport and deposition along the circuit. This is mainly a
consequence of the different carrier gas (steam þ hydrogen) ﬂow
paths compared to Case 1A, particularly after the start of perma-
nent core uncovery. This affects in particular the FP/SM transport
and retention in the RCS as described in Section 3.3.
At the predicted time of RV lower head plastic rupture (5606.7 s)
due to mechanic stress, the total mass of slump molten materials
into the lower head reached 74 tons (see Table 3) representing ~80%
of the total mass of active core materials. The total mass of H2
produced is 128.15 kg. Following the lower head failure, about 8
tons of corium remain inside the vessel and 66 tons ﬂows out.
3.1.3. Case 2A
In Case 2A the accident evolution is identical to the Case 1A until
the discharge of accumulators occurs at 3293 s when primary
pressure reaches the threshold value of 4.525 MPa.
Due to thewater discharge of the ACCUs, the lower part of active
core is covered by water (Fig. 6). The water level reaches its
maximum value (~2 m) at ~8000 s. Then the water level in the core
decreases gradually and the second total core uncovery is reached
at ~15000 s. Just after this event the last rapid injection from ACCU
(~15150 s) occurs. The third last core uncovery occurs ~400 s before
RV lower head failure (18754 s).Fig. 6. Collapsed water level in the active core (Case 2A).
Fig. 7. Material composition in the RV lower plenum (Case 2B). Fig. 8. Fractional release of the Cs, Te and Sb (Case 1A).
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prevents its rapid degradation and leads to a signiﬁcant prolon-
gation of the core degradation process compared to Case 1A
(Table 3).
The main oxidation period is however longer (2800 se5000 s)
due to the lower rate of material containing non-oxidised Zr
relocating into the RV lower plenum. The total mass of H2 pro-
duced increases to 206 kg compared to 133.4 kg of Case 1A
(Table 3).
The comparison of the timing of main events (Table 3) shows a
considerable delay of the timing of the slump of corium. The total
slumped masses are lower as a consequence of the generally lower
temperatures observed in the lower core regions due to the water
delivered from accumulators.
At predicted time of RV lower head plastic rupture (18754 s) due
to mechanic stress the total mass of slump molten materials into
the lower head reached 45.6 tons (Table 3). It is only ~49% from the
total mass of active core materials (~92.6 t). The remaining mass of
water in the RV lower plenum is still ~14.5 tons. Following the
lower head failure, about 5 tons of corium remain inside the vessel
and 40 tons ﬂows out.Table 4













Xe 265.7 94.86 97.45 87.5 82.77
I 11.14 94.84 97.44 87.44 82.69
Cs 139.98 e e e e
Rb 19.71 e e e e
Te 22.0 91.59 95.36 78.64 75.96
Sb 0.8284 92.74 96.10 80.59 77.11
Semi-volatile FP
Ba 71.417 0.01058 0.01303 3.457 1.64
Ru 108.55 1.09e-3 1.71e-3 1.459 0.936
Sr 54.28 6.66e-5 2.12e-4 0.3132 0.0809
Mo 162.83 2.021 1.69 9.984 13.07
Low volatile FP
Pu 675.14 e e e e
U 65455.7 e e e e
Tc 42.85 e e e e
Structural materials
SM Ag 6434.55 2.077 0.821 1.035 7.276
SM In 1285.23 42.55 19.8 27.97 32.39
SM Cd 419.1 44.64 23.31 33.12 35.45
SM Sn 300.2 48.29 54.93 50.99 50.74
SM Fe 20.18 e e e e
SM Cr 9.392 e e e e3.1.4. Case 2B
In Case 2B the different break location appears to have small
inﬂuence on the timing of the main events up to time of molten
pool creation in the core (3836 s). As shown in Fig. 7, the molten
pool remains longer in the active core region and massive reloca-
tion (slumping) of the molten materials to RV lower plenum is
predicted at 16693 s, i.e. till after the depletion of accumulators
(15520 s). However, the time of RV lower head failure occurs only
slightly later than in Case 2A (18754 s) at 19344 s.
The fact that the molten pool remains longer inside the active
core region than in Case 2A has two consequences: 1) the total
production of hydrogen increases from 206 kg to 226.4 kg, and 2)
the total aerosols mass produced increases from 1184 kg to 1627 kg.
The ﬁnal mass of slump molten materials into the lower head at
time of failure decreases from 45.6 tons (Case 2A) to 21.9 tons (Case
2B), which is only ~22% from total mass of active core materials.
Following the lower head failure, about 2 tons of corium remain
inside the vessel and 20 tons ﬂows out.
Similarly to what already observed for Case 1B, after the start of
permanent core uncovery the ﬂow paths of the carrier gas
(steamþ hydrogen) differ to those of Case 2A affecting in particular
the FP/SM transport and retention the RCS as described in
Section 3.3.
3.2. FP/SM release from the core
The considered initial mass inventory and the calculated frac-
tional release from the core, expressed in the term of “cumulative
fraction from initial inventory (i.i.) in %”, is presented for all cases
in Table 4 for most important FP/SM. The cumulative releasedFig. 9. Fractional release of the Ba, Ru, Mo and U (Case 1A).
Fig. 10. Fractional release of the SIC materials and Sn (Case 1A).
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considerably affected by the availability of the accumulators that
causes the process of core degradation and molten material relo-
cation into the RV lower plenum to be signiﬁcantly slower in Case
2A and Case 2B.
The calculated cumulative fractional release of highly volatile
FPs is:
 Case 1A and 1B: in the range of 91%e98% i.i., indicating that
more than 90% of fuel rods melt. The release kinetics of Cs, Te
and Sb from fuel for Case 1A is shown on Fig. 8 and corresponds
to a progression of fuel heat-up and melting.
 Case 2A and Case 2B in the range of 76%e88%; as expected, these
values are lower compared to Case 1A/B because the extent of
fuel melting was slightly lower (check in Table 3 the masses of
corium in RV lower plenum at time of failure).
These results are in agreement with the Phebus FPT1
(Jacquemain et al., 2000) and FPT2 (Gregoire et al., 2008) experi-
ments, where the measured release of the species I, Cs and Te at the
bundle outlet was in the range of 70%e87%.Table 5
Total retention factor in circuit for selected FP/SM [1 means 100%].
FP/SM Case-1A Case-1B Case-2A Case-2B
Highly volatile
Xe 0.006 0.008 0.008 0.004
I 0.467 0.688 0.477 0.513
Cs 0.508 0.617 0.529 0.623
Rb 0.457 0.553 0.442 0.527
Te 0.484 0.658 0.481 0.613
Sb 0.205 0.681 0.271 0.28
Semi-volatile
Ba 0.192 0.29 0.122 0.548
Ru 0.198 0.382 0.172 0.287
Sr 0.619 0.555 0.308 0.661
Mo 0.443 0.71 0.264 0.456
Low-volatile
Pu 0.536 0.732 0.116 0.39
U 0.542 0.732 0.112 0.374
Tc 0.543 0.731 0.111 0.88
Structural materials
SM Ag 0.659 0.696 0.528 0.79
SM In 0.568 0.679 0.534 0.743
SM Cd 0.611 0.651 0.359 0.66
SM Sn 0.48 0.631 0.492 0.579
SM Fe 0 0.695 0.282 0.361
SM Cr 0.724 0.659 0.192 0.701The calculated cumulative fractional release of the semi-volatile
FPs is:
 Case 1A and Case 1B: in the range of ~1e3% i.i. (Ru) to ~2% i.i.
(Mo). The release kinetics of Ba, Ru andMo from fuel for Case 1A
is shown on Fig. 9 and corresponds to a progression of fuel heat-
up and melting. The release of Ba and Ru is predicted only
during the beginning phase of fuel heat-up and corresponds
only to the gap-release, whereas Mo release is governed by its
evaporation and mass transfer process.
 Case 2A and 2B: in the range of ~1% i.i. (Ru) to ~13% i.i. (Mo),
signiﬁcantly increased by two to four orders of magnitude (for
Ba and Sr respectively) and ﬁve times for Mo compared to Case
1A/B.
The situation for low-volatile FPs is similar to the one of semi-
volatile: the increase is of two orders of magnitude in Case 2A
and 2B compared to Case 1A and 1B where nearly negligible release
of low-volatile FPs is predicted. The release kinetics of U is given as
representative example in Fig. 9 for Case 1A.
The calculated cumulative release fractions of Ag, In, Cd from
control rods and Sn as SM from Zircaloy alloy of fuel rod claddings
and guide tubes are similar in all cases:
 Case 1A: Ag ~2% i.i., In, Cd >40% i.i., Sn ~50% i.i. . As shown in
Fig. 10 the release kinetics of Sn corresponds to the kinetics of Zr
oxidation (Fig. 4), whereas Cd, In and mainly Ag are signiﬁcantly
released also during late degradation phase, when the massive
slumping of corium (molten pool) to RV lower head occurs.
 Case 1B: the released fractions of Ag, In and Cd are lowered by a
factor ~2 compared to Case 1A, and only small release is pre-
dicted after ~4500 s.
 Case 2B: higher cumulative release (factor of ~7) is predicted
only for Ag; mainly predicted during massive material slumping
after 16000 s (Fig. 7).
 Case 2A: The accumulated release of the SIC materials and Sn is
predicted approximately similar to Case 1A.3.3. FP/SM transport and retention the RCS
The transport and deposition of the FP/SM (either as aerosols or
as direct vapour condensation on the walls) depend mainly on the
leakage pathways through primary circuit, release kinetics from the
core and on their chemical speciation.
Themain leakage pathways for FP/SM transport from the core to
the break are not identical for all cases and this has considerable
inﬂuence on the total retention in the circuit. The total retention
factor (RF) in circuit for selected FP/SM is shown in Table 5 and it is
deﬁned as the ratio of deposited mass to inlet mass.
3.3.1. Case 1A
In Case 1A, twomain pathways are identiﬁed for the transport of
FP/SM from the RV upper plenum to the break:
 one pathway is from the core to the broken loop and through the
SG U-tubes to the break in the cold leg. The calculated retention
factor (RF) is in the range of ~0.2 (Ba, Ru, Sb) to ~0.66 (SM Ag);
the deposition is predominant in the SG tubes volume and in the
reactor vessel (RV) cold collector; thermophoresis is the prin-
cipal deposition phenomenon in the U-tube SG pipes followed
by bend impaction; for iodine and cadmium direct vapour
condensation to the walls is also observed.
 the other pathway is from the core to the RV dome and through
the RV cold collector to the break in the cold leg. Both turbulent-
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the horizontal part of the cold leg lead to signiﬁcant depositions
(about 65%) of the aerosols.
The calculated RF is in the range of 0.5 for highly volatile ele-
ments, 0.2 for Ba and Ru, between 0.4 and 0.8 for Sr, Mo and low-
volatile elements.
3.3.2. Case 1B
In Case 1B themain pathway is from the RV upper plenum to the
RV dome and through the RV cold collector to the break in the cold
leg.
The calculated RF is generally higher than in Case 1A, except Sr:
in the range of ~0.6 for highly volatile elements, 0.3 for Ba and Ru
and ~0.73 for Mo and low-volatiles. Again turbulent-eddy impac-
tion and gravitational settling cause the main deposition (about
74%). The higher percentage is linked with a higher aerosols con-
centration that leads to an enhanced agglomeration process and to
an increased turbulent-eddy impaction and gravitational settling.
3.3.3. Case 2A
In Case 2A the FP/SM leakage pathways are the same as for Case
1A, but the total calculated retention factor is somehow lower
(about 59%).
The calculated RF for highly-volatile FP is similar to Case 1A and
for SM except Cd, Fe and Cr (source masses of Fe and Cr are insig-
niﬁcant anyway); it is in the range of ~0.15 for Ba and Ru, and ~0.53
for Cs, SM-Ag, and SM-In. The RF is clearly lower for semi-volatile
FP and especially for low-volatile FP respect to Case 1A.
The duration of the degradation period in Case 2A is substan-
tially longer compared to Case 1A. Therefore, as shown in Fig.11, hot
gas coming to broken loop No.1 causes overheating of the broken
loop walls including SG pipes walls (note that SG pipes are
completely uncovered at time ~8000 s due to evaporation of the
secondary water). The temperatures of all cells of broken loop's SG
tubes are very similar (i.e. TW_CEL6 is representative) and this
leads to re-evaporation of the volatile species already deposited
that can reach the break and leak out of the circuit.
The lower retention factor predicted in Case 2A compared to
Case 1A for semi and low-volatile FP can be explained through their
mostly not continuous release kinetics from the core (Fig. 9). In
Case 2A a lower fraction of these FPs released from the core during
relative short time periods is realized via the broken loop SG, while
in Case 1A the ﬂow to the break comes from the upper plenum of
the RV.Fig. 11. Wall temperatures in the volumes HOL1, CELL6, ULEGAB1 and COL1 according
to Fig. 1 nodalization (Case 2A).3.3.4. Case 2B
In Case 2B there are three FPs/SMs leakage pathways from RV
upper plenum to the break:
 One pathway is through the RV dome to RV cold collector and
then to the break.
 The other two pathways are to the hot legs of the intact primary
loops and then through the SG U-tubes to the RV cold collector
and ﬁnally to the break in the broken loop. The total calculated
retention factor is therefore the highest one (about 75%).
In comparison with Case 2A the calculated RF is slightly
increased for highly-volatile FPs and also for SIC and structural
materials. The increased deposition is more evident for semi-
volatile FPs (up to factor ~4 for Ba) and for low-volatile (up to
factor ~8 for Tc), but mostly is about 3e4 times higher. In Case 2B
compared to Case 2A, the deposition of some high volatile (e.g. Rb),
semi-volatile (Mo) species, SIC (Ag, not highly volatile Cd) and
structural materials is signiﬁcant also in the tubes of the intact loop
SGs. It should be noted that, same as in Case 2A, in Case 2B the hot
gases coming to intact loops cause evaporation of the secondary
water from these SGs, but the following overheating of the SG tubes
walls is not so strong as in Case 2A. Therefore, re-evaporation of
some already deposited Rb and Mo species (e.g. Rb2MoO4) is less
extensive than Case 2A.
Besides SG tubes, the deposition is substantial mainly in the
cold-leg due to gravitational settling, in cold-leg collector due to
eddy impaction and also in the vessel by-pass due to
thermophoresis.3.4. Chemical speciation of the FP/SM released from the core
Besides noble gases and Cs (partially also Rb, Te, Ba, Ru, Mo) the
iodine is one of the most important nuclide from the point of view
of source term and radiological consequences. Calculations per-
formed with SOPHAEROS/ASTEC module for integral Phebus FP
experiments (Girault et al., 2007) (Girault et al., 2009), clearly
indicated that the key species responsible for the iodine chemical
speciation in the primary circuit are mainly Cs (Rb), Mo and Cd;
partially iodine can react also with Ag, Ba, Sr, In and Sn. The strong
inﬂuence of both their release kinetics and related species ther-
modynamic properties on the iodine speciation in different envi-
ronment (reducing/oxidizing) were discussed, too. The key species
responsible for the volatile iodine persistence in the RCS of Phebus
FP tests is molybdic acid (H2MoO4) because a non-negligible part of
it remains as vapour in the upper plenum above fuel bundle. Then,Fig. 12. Inlet masses of I, Cs, Rb and Mo from core to the circuit (Case 1A).
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molecular Cs2 forming Cs2MoO4 and almost not allowing formation
of CsI and RbI (note that behaviour of Rb is similar to Cs) if the Mo/
Cs(Rb) bundle release molar ratio is sufﬁciently high. In such a case
the SOPHAEROS chemistry model predicts signiﬁcant reaction of
iodinewith Cd by formation of cadmium iodides, mostly CdI2 (i.e., if
SIC control rod is present e this is a case of FPT1 (Jacquemain et al.,
2000) and FPT2 (DATA, 2004) tests). When SIC is not present (FPT3
test (Payot et al., 2010)) the signiﬁcant part of iodine remains in
gaseous form of HI and also creation of highly volatile species
I2MoO2, SnI4, SnI2 is predicted. On the other hand when the Mo/
Cs(Rb) molar ratio is low (i.e. there is a surplus of Cs and Rb) the
predicted dominant iodine species are CsI (RbI) and their dimers. In
this case Cd has negligible inﬂuence on iodine chemistry.Fig. 14. Integrated caesium chemical speciation.3.4.1. Case 1A
The calculation of Case 1A (Fig. 12) predicts a signiﬁcant surplus
of Cs (Rb) released from the core compared to Mo (Cs: ~133 kg, Mo:
~3.3 kg) and the release kinetics of the iodine in term of fractional
release from the core is the same as for Cs and Rb.
Due to this fact, only a very small portion of Cs (Rb) is captured
by Mo because of the reaction of H2MoO4 with CsOH and Cs2.
Therefore, nearly all iodine (~98%) will reach the containment
mainly in the form of caesium iodide and its dimers and secondly
bonded in rubidium iodide and its dimers (Fig.13). The formation of
other iodine species (e.g. AgI, CdI, InI, SnI2, I2MoO2, BaI2, SrI2) is
predicted to be negligible.
At the end of calculation (Fig. 14) the main predicted Cs com-
pound are caesium hydroxide (CsOH) and its dimers (~59% of the Cs
mass), and caesium tellurides (CsTe and Cs2Te) ~24%. The per-
centage of caesium in CsI and its dimers (~8%) is limited by the total
iodine source. Only ~4% of Cs source mass to circuit is chemically
bonded with Mo (as di-caesium molybdate) and the reason is the
very limited Mo source compared to Cs source.3.4.2. Case 1B
In Case 1B the gas temperature in the RV upper plenum is
signiﬁcantly lower compared to Case 1A. As a consequence some
differences in chemical speciation are predicted, since chemical
reactions dependmainly on temperature of the carrier gas in the RV
upper plenum.
The change in predicted iodine integrated chemical speciation
during the analysed transient phase is negligible (i.e. all iodine
reacts with Cs and only partly with Rb) and, as in Case 1A, the main
reason is a strong surplus of the Cs (Rb) inlet masses to RCS
compared to iodine and Mo sources during the analysed phase. In
addition, the relatively low carrier gas temperature in the RV upper
plenum prevents the creation of any Mo species, i.e. all Mo remainsFig. 13. Integrated iodine chemical speciation.in the elementary form. Creation of the other iodine species as InI,
AgI, CdI remains negligible.
On the contrary with Case 1A, the relatively low carrier gas
temperature in the RV upper plenum prevents the creation of any
CsOH and Cs2MoO4 (also Mo does not create molybdic acid) and
most of Cs remains in the molecular (Cs2) or elementary forms.3.4.3. Case 2A
In Case 2A despite the fact that the cumulative released mass of
Mo (~16.3 kg) is several times larger compared to Case 1A (~3.3 kg)
and Case 1B (~2.8 kg) and that the cumulative released mass of Cs
(Rb) is slightly decreased (by ~10%), the surplus of the Cs (Rb)
released mass compared to Mo released mass remains still signif-
icant, as it is shown in Fig. 15. Therefore, as expected, the dominant
iodine compound is still CsI and its dimers.
In comparison with the Case 1A, the integrated chemical
speciation of the iodine in the circuit at the end of calculation
(Fig. 13) shows that the fraction of iodine chemically bonded in CsI
and its dimers decreases from ~98% (Case 1A) to ~91% and, that this
fraction is increased for all other iodine compounds (e.g. RbI, AgI,
CdI2, BaHIO, BaI2). In addition, iodine is predicted to be present on
not negligible level also in the form of hydrogen iodide (HI gas) and
as highly volatile compounds: molybdenum iodide oxide (I2MoO2)
and tin iodides (SnI2, SnI4), which exist in vapour form at temper-
atures greater than 150 C (i.e. no deposition in the circuit). This is
mainly a consequence of the increased Mo source, which throughFig. 15. Inlet masses of I, Cs, Rb and Mo from core to the circuit (Case 2A).
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molybdate (Cs2MoO4). In case of iodine compounds with Ba (BaHIO
and BaI2) it is also consequence of substantially increased Ba source
in Case 2A compared to Case 1A and Case 1B.
The fraction of Cs chemically bonded in caesium hydroxide and
its dimers and in caesium tellurides is mainly inﬂuenced by the
evolution of the gas temperature in the RV upper plenum since the
afﬁnity of Cs to create hydroxides increases with gas temperature.
3.4.4. Case 2B
The gas temperature in RV upper plenum is sufﬁciently high in
Case 2B not to block chemical reaction of Rb and mainly of Mo, as
predicted for Case 1B. Therefore, the main difference between Case
2A and Case 2B from the point of view of chemical speciation is the
difference in Mo release kinetics from the fuel which is mainly due
to different evolution of core degradation and fuel relocation to RV
lower plenum.
As in the previous Case 2A the dominant iodine compounds
remains CsI and its dimers. Highly volatile iodine species (HI,
I2MoO2, SnI2) are created on remarkable level in Case 2B. A more or
less continuous Mo release is predicted in Case 2B till after ~9000 s
and after Cs source becomes less signiﬁcant (Fig. 15). More of Cs is
consumed by Mo to create Cs2MoO4 and consequently iodine can
react with other elements.
The change in predicted integrated Cs chemical speciation
during the analysed transient phase is lso not signiﬁcant and is very
similar to previous Case 2A. As already explained, the increased
fraction of caesiummolybdate (Cs2MoO4) and decreased fraction of
the molecular non-reacted Cs2 later in time is mainly a conse-
quence of the increased Mo source after ~9000 s in combination
with a gradual increase of carrier gas temperature.
In summary, the predicted dominant iodine species are CsI and
its dimers. As in the Cases 2A and 2B this surplus is partly reduced
due to increased Mo source, some fraction of iodine is allowed to
react also with other FP/SM. The predicted dominant caesium
species are caesium hydroxide (CsOH) and its dimers, and caesium
tellurides. The fraction of Cs chemically bonded in caesium hy-
droxide and its dimers and in caesium tellurides is mainly inﬂu-
enced by the evolution of the carrier gas temperature since the
afﬁnity of Cs to create hydroxides increases with gas temperature.
4. Summary and conclusions
The evolution of the severe accident for a reference three-loop
PWR 1000 MWe initiated by a Medium Break on the cold leg
(de ¼ 51.6 mm), combined with the total loss of electric power
supply (Black-Out) has been investigated using the integral code
ASTEC.
A sensitivity analysis has been performed in terms of break
position and accumulators availability.
The different location of the break in the cold leg has an impact
on the carrier gas ﬂow paths in the primary circuit affecting the
temperature in the RV Upper Plenum where the main chemical
reactions occur. This in turn has an effect on the chemical specia-
tion of the FPs. Particularly, the afﬁnity of Mo to react with Cs is
strongly dependant on the carrier gas temperature: at tempera-
tures below ~1200 K the reaction of Mo with Cs is suppressed and
the dominant iodine species are CsI and its dimers. Under the same
temperature conditions the Rb remains in elementary form and the
reaction with iodine becomes negligible.
Different pathways have clearly a considerable inﬂuence on the
total retention of FPs/SMs in the circuit. Indeed the highest reten-
tion factor (~75%) is predicted when several pathways go through
the intact loops resulting in a high deposition in the SGs U-tubes
due to thermo-phoresis, in the horizontal part of the cold leg due togravitational settling and at cold leg collector due to turbulent-
eddy impaction.
The accumulator availability extends the duration of the core
degradation process before RV failure occurs. This increases
signiﬁcantly the total production of hydrogen and the cumulative
releasedmass of semi (Ba, Mo, Ru) and low volatile (U, Pu) FPs since
the heated and molten fuel remains longer in the core region. On
the contrary the cumulative released mass of highly volatile FPs (I,
Cs, Te) is slightly decreased due to the lower amount of core melt
because of the cooling effect from evaporation of the water dis-
charged from the accumulators.
The SIC release occurs mainly as the control rods guide tubes fail
and it depends on the amount of molten pool and on the slumping.
When accumulators are not available a larger molten pool is pre-
sent with a fast slumping process. The availability of accumulators
produces a smaller molten pool with slower slumping but occur-
ring in several steps. The compensating effect results in calculated
cumulative release fractions of the control rod materials which are
predicted on a similar level for all cases.
According to the equilibrium chemistry model, the Mo/Cs (Rb)
molar ratio has the most inﬂuence on the fraction of iodine which
can reach the containment in the gaseous or highly volatile form. In
all the analyses performed, a signiﬁcant surplus of Cs (Rb) source is
calculated over the Mo source. Therefore the predicted dominant
iodine species to the containment are CsI and its dimers. When this
surplus is partly reduced to an increase in the Mo source, some
fraction of iodine is allowed to react also with other FPs/SMs (Ba,
Ag, Cd). A 3e4% of iodine which reaches the break exists in gaseous
(HI) and highly volatile metal-iodides (I2MoO2, SnI2, SnI4) species.
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